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We hear the phrase ‘too big to fail’ a lot these days. It
means a company that is so vital to the national economy
that its demise would be catastrophic, so the government
will go to extraordinary lengths to keep it afloat. General
Motors Corporation, the sinking US car maker, is said to be
too big to fail. Lehman Brothers, the investment bank
whose collapse precipitated financial crises around the
world, was too big to fail - although George W Bush’s
Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Paulson, didn't realize
that in time. And, as the world credit market tries to
become unstuck before a global depression sets in, we hear
the same thing about two US bank holding companies,
Bank of America and Citibank. 
But what exactly does it take to make a company too big to
fail? In the case of General Motors, it is the huge number of
jobs that would be lost if it went under, but that
consideration doesn’t apply to a financial services firm - at
least not directly. In the case of banks, it’s the magnitude of
the monetary loss that matters. Bank of America has assets
of approximately $2.7 trillion and Citibank has assets of
around $2.3 trillion. The GDP of the United States is $14
trillion, so each of these banks has assets in excess of 14% of
the yearly output of the largest economy on Earth. That's too
big to fail.
But I would argue that, if you can be too big to fail, you also
can be too big to succeed. Your very size can be your undoing,
as it may have been for the huge, lumbering dinosaurs, who
weren't flexible enough to survive the global catastrophe that
our small, furry, mammalian ancestors were able to weather. 
Consider the two giant banks. Over $2 trillion in assets
sounds great, right? Well, maybe, but there's also the small
matter of their liabilities. Both banking companies hold
enormous quantities of so-called ‘toxic securities’, which is a
polite way of saying mortgage-backed debts. As many of the
mortgages are effectively worthless, these companies may
have huge liabilities. It's estimated that there might be as
much as $11 trillion of such debt in the US economy, because
many large banks essentially bet the farm on the incredibly
naive idea that house prices would rise forever. The fact that
they had always gone through cycles of rising and falling for,
oh the previous 5,000 years or so, seems to have been lost on
the self-styled geniuses who created the mess we're in. 
The real problem, though, is that nobody knows if that $11
trillion figure is right, because nobody knows what the toxic
securities are really worth. They may be worth anything
from close to their nominal value to zero, and that's a heck of
an error bar. So let's look at Citibank. Yes, it has $2.3 trillion
in assets, but it also has big liabilities. How big? It's
unknown. There might be, say, $1 trillion in liabilities, in
which case Citibank is in great shape. But there could well be
$3 trillion in liabilities, in which case this enormous bank is
actually broke. And no one, not the chief executive of
Citibank nor the head of the US Treasury nor a gypsy
reading tea leaves, can say which is the case. The banks had
grown so large, and had created such an elaborate web of
interdependent, chopped-up, over-leveraged securities that
their own financial people had no real idea of how much
debt they were taking on. 
In other words, I think Bank of America and Citibank (and
Lehman Brothers and most of the other companies at the
heart of the global financial crisis) have become too big to
succeed because they are too big to be managed. No one
individual - or group of individuals - can assimilate the
amount of information needed to keep tabs on what goes on
at a company that size, so even if they themselves are not
crooked or incompetent, they are fated to be hostages to
crooked or incompetent people who work, undetected, at
some lower level of the Byzantine corporate structure. Yet
until recently, these companies were touted as the epitome
of excellence, precisely because, through mergers and
acquisitions, they had grown so enormous.Why do we mistake growth for success? When did sheer size
become equivalent to excellence? Because a monomaniacal
insistence on being the biggest so often derives entirely from
the person at the top, it seems fair to ask if there isn’t some
psychological explanation. Washington Post columnist Sally
Jenkins has a marvelous article in the 19 February 2009
issue, ‘Armchair Field Generals, Getting Sacked on Wall
Street’, in which she notes that the hypercompetitive CEOs
of large corporations were usually good sportsmen, but
never quite good enough to become great. “Maybe the real
lesson,” she writes, “is to beware of the wannabe. Some of
these people seem to fall into the dangerous category of
‘pretty good’ athletes … Experience plus some armchair
Freudian analysis tells us there are a fair number of
overcompensated jerks out there who almost made it in
sports … There’s the sneaking suspicion that more than one
shareholder is suffering from these guys’ sublimated failures
to reach the top in the more primal competitions of their
youth … The most important quality of leadership,” she goes
on to state, “is not competitiveness, but judgment”. 
And as corporate boards, which appoint CEOs, are usually
stocked with present or past CEOs of other corporations, it
shouldn’t surprise us when these win-at-all-cost short-
sighters pick people like themselves to head the companies
they oversee. And so the culture of ‘whoever has the most
when he dies, wins’ goes merrily on. 
But where did that culture come from, and why did it get so
out of control? I think the answer might be pretty simple,
and if I’m right, it explains why I also think the current
debate about excessive CEO compensation misses the point.
You will recall that, as part of the financial bailout, the
government proposed to limit the bonuses and other
payouts to the CEOs of the corporations receiving federal
funds, which provoked an immediate outcry on the part of
their boards, the claim being that, without enormous
compensation, companies would not be able to hire or retain
the best people. Don't worry about this side issue, they said,
fix the real problems.
Well, never mind that ‘the best people’ have just lost
hundreds of billions of dollars and nearly wrecked the
economy of the world. (I could do that, and would happily
accept a lot less in pay and bonuses than they keep
demanding.) And never mind that I am unaware of a single
study that shows a correlation between the salary and
bonuses paid to executives and their talent (in fact, in many
professions, like ours, money usually isn't the motivating
factor in a career at all). The uproar in the United States over
bonuses just paid to some of the very employees of the
insurance giant AIG who caused the mess that company is
now in suggests that the public has realized something that
the Bush Administration never did and that the Obama
Administration may not have figured out yet: CEO
compensation is not a side issue; CEO compensation is the
problem. If you offer outrageous salaries to people who run
your companies, and give them even more outrageous
bonuses if they increase share prices and revenues - not
profit, revenues - then it stands to reason that you will
probably attract greedy, aggressive people who are only
interested in short-term results. That's what created the
Wall Street culture that's got us into this fix.
And the reason you're reading this in Genome Biology,
instead of in The Economist, is that I fear this culture may
now be spreading, like some virulent flu strain, to the
pharmaceutical industry. Look at what has happened in the
past 15 years. A wave of mergers is threatening to reduce the
number of so-called ‘big pharma’ companies to a handful,
and the results haven’t always been pretty. Pfizer almost
choked to death from swallowing Pharmacia/Upjohn a few
years ago, and now is planning to acquire Wyeth. Merck has
announced plans to merge with Schering-Plough. And
analysts (more about them later) are busily proposing other
fusions. 
I’m not sure this trend makes much sense from the point of
view of the primary purpose of these companies, which is to
discover new drugs (although in the short term it may help
fill one of the companies’ empty pipeline). There are no data
indicating that increasing the size of a pharmaceutical
company leads to increased ability to make pharmaceuticals.
In fact, there are worrying suggestions that it may often do
the opposite. Innovation usually scales inversely with
bureaucratic complexity. If a merger or acquisition is
proposed solely for the purpose of acquiring a drug that one
company makes, longer-term issues of research
complementarity or synergy of talent might get secondary
consideration, leading to internal culture wars and strategic
paralysis. 
Recent history may bear this out. Despite more than a
decade of mergers and acquisitions, big pharma actually
makes no more drugs per company today than it did in 1995
(although one has to be careful to take into account drug
approval rates by regulatory agencies, which also change
with time). Larger companies also have a tendency to be
more conservative, so the worry is that innovation could
suffer as firms merge. Biopharmaceuticals, the newest trend
in the industry and the source of about 50% of its profits last
year, originated in biotechnology companies, not
pharmaceutical houses. The notion that proteins such as
antibodies could be profitable drugs was resisted for years by
big pharma, which is now scrambling furiously to catch up. 
Of course, giant pharmaceutical companies can buy
innovation, new targets, and even lead compounds from
small biotech companies - and frequently do. That may well
be the future: big pharma ‘outsourcing’ target discovery and
some other aspects of innovation to smaller, independently-
operating biotech arms, with the parent company focusing
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terrible model, but I still think we'd end up with fewer drugs,
since the large pharmaceutical companies actually used to
discover the bulk of them, and there are a lot of weak
biotechnology companies out there. 
Industry analysts love to tout mergers and acquisitions as
tools to raise share prices, and if stockholders clamor for
their advice to be followed it can seriously affect those share
prices. I've never understood why analysts seem to exert
such influence on the market. I've known a few, and I have to
say I was not that impressed. It seems crazy that part of the
financial health of companies whose output is so important
to human health should rest with people who are not
scientists or business executives, who don’t have the public
welfare in mind, and whose track record is spotty, to say the
least. 
Look, I'm not trying to bash the pharmaceutical industry
here. I have enormous respect for it, and for the people who
work in it: most of them are motivated by a sincere desire to
improve the health of mankind. It's that respect that leads to
my concern for the industry's own health. Some mergers and
acquisitions are good ones, of course, but I remain
unconvinced that, overall, a few huge drug companies will
innovate better than a larger number of smaller ones, even
with the help of biotech partners. 
The notion that something can be too big to succeed
shouldn't be that foreign, because it even applies to people.
There's a famous example of an individual who became so
big and lumbering that he was easily bested by a smaller,
more nimble adversary. You'll find his story in Chapter 17 of
the First Book of Samuel. His name was Goliath.
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